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COMMON LAW MARRIAGE IN MINNESOTA

COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE IN MINNESOTA:
A PROBLEM IN SOCIAL SECURITYt
By
THOMAS CLIFFORD BILLIG*

and
JAMES PIIYLLIP LYNCuI**

T

INTRODUCTION
HE vanguard of the army of applications for Federal Old-Age

Benefits filed under sections 203(a)' and 2052 of the Social
Security Act has made its appearance in the offices of the Social
Security Board throughout the country. In this great rank and
file are thousands of applications from widows of deceased wage
earners. And plentifully sprinkled through the latter class are applications by women who allege that they are widows by virtue
of a common-law marriage with the deceased.
The adjudication of these claims by the Social Security Board
will open anew the law of common-law marriage in the fifty-one
jurisdictions covered by the Act.' This revival results, in the
*Member of the bar, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and Supreme
Court of the United States; Senior Attorney, Office of the General Counsel,
Social Security Board; Lecturer in Law, Catholic University of America.
**Member of the bar, Supreme Court of Alabama and Supreme Court
of the United States; Claims Attorney, Office of the General Counsel,
Social Security Board.
tAll opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors as
individuals only. They are in no sense binding upon either the Social
Security Board or the Office of the General Counsel to that Board. The
authors are particularly indebted to Mr. Leonard Calhoun, Assistant General
Counsel to the Social Security Board, for many valuable suggestions during
preparation of the manuscript.

'(1935) Pub. No. 271, 74th Cong.; 49 Stat. 620, 623; 42 U. S. C. A.,
sec. 403(a) :
"If any individual dies before attaining the age of sixty-five, there shall
be paid to his estate an amount equal to 3Y2 per centum of the total wages
determined by the Board to have been paid to him, with respect to employment after December 31, 1936."
21d.; 49 Stat. 620, 624; 42 U. S. C. A., sec. 405:
"If any amount payable to an estate under section 203 or 204 is $500
or less, such amount may, under regulations prescribed by the Board, be
paid to the persons found by the Board to be entitled thereto under the law
of the State in which the deceased was domiciled, without the necessity of
compliance with the requirements of law with respect to the administration
of such
estate."
3

Title II of the Social Security Act which provides for Federal Old-Age
Benefits is in force in the forty-eight states, Alaska, Hawaii and the
District of Columbia.
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first instance, from the fact that section 205 provides that, where
the death benefit under section 203 is $500 or less, the Social Security Board (without administration of the estate) may pay directly to those persons found by it "to be entitled thereto under
the law of the state in which the deceased was domiciled. .. ."
In this type of case the Social Security Board is directly concerned with the common-law marriage problem. This concern
arises in the following manner: Let us assume that the legal
widow of a deceased wage earner is entitled to the death benefit
provided for in section 203(a) of the Act, under the law of the
state in which her deceased husband died domiciled. If it so
happens that the applicant alleges that she is a common-law widow,
at least two findings must be made by the Board before payment
can be certified directly to her under section 205: (1) that the
law of the state in question recognizes common-law marriages,
and (2) that the applicant has met the conditions prescribed by
the law of that state for establishing herself as the common-law
widow of the deceased. If the marriage is sought to be established
by acts occurring outside the domiciliary state, an additional complication is added.
It is interesting to notice, however, that the problem of common-law marriage is not confined to the cases where payment is
certified under section 205. Suppose the amount of benefit involved is more than $500, and consequently the payment is certified to the executor or administrator of the alleged husband's
estate. True, the administrator is now substituted for the Social
Security Board as the distributing medium, but the legal position
of the common-law widow as distributee is, of course, determined
by the same state law which governed the Social Security Board
in certifying payment under section 205.
Not only has the advent of the Social Security Act accentuated
the whole problem of common-law marriage, but the questions to
be determined promise much activity for courts and lawyers.
Heretofore, most of the court decisions which concern the legal
rights of common-law widows have resulted from litigation over
the estates of decedents who are alleged to be common-law husbands. This group of cases is decidedly limited, particularly as
to the number of decisions which reach the appellate courts in
certain jurisdictions, for the obvious reason that decedents in the
class of society where common-law marriages flourish generally
leave no property at all, and rarely leave enough property to
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justify expensive litigation.4 In contrast, the Social Security Act
assures an "estate" to every wage-earner covered by the statute
who dies before the age of sixty-five, and to a considerable number of wage-earners who die after attaining the age of sixty-five.'
Consequently, as the amount of benefits becomes increasingly more
substantial, considerable litigation is bound to arise with respect
to the rights of surviving relatives (including common-law widows)
to share in the distribution of the estates thus created by the
federal government.
In view, therefore, of the direct interest which the Social Security Board has in the inheritance rights of these common-law
widows, certain lawyers in the Office of the General Counsel to
the Board have engaged in an intensive study of the legal problems of common-law marriage as reflected in the statutes and
decisions of the several states. As Minnesota was one of the
jurisdictions studied, the results of the investigation are submitted
here for the consideration of the bar of that state.
COMMON-LAW

MARRIAGE GENERALLY

All the decisions which define the term "commiron-law marriage" agree that such a union grows out of a contract of marriage
without solemnization in any particular form. The definitions are
not uniform with respect to the need for cohabitation in the marital
relation or the "habit and repute" of marriage in order that a valid
union may be created. Thus, common-law marriage is a method
of entering into the marital relationship without observing the
solemnities or forms prescribed by either church or state. Such
6
marriages are now denied legal sanction in some states but, as
will be shown later, Minnesota is not in this group.Common-law marriages may be divided into two types: (a)
per verba de futuro cum copula and (b) per verba de praesenti.
4
1n some half dozen jurisdictions the total number of cases involving
common-law marriage which reached the highest courts in their respective
states were as follows: Alabama, 16; Florida, 11; Georgia, 13; Iowa, 13;
South Carolina, 8; South Dakota, 4.
5
See Social Security Act, sec. 203(b) and (c); 49 Stat. 620, 624;
42 U. S. C. A., sec. 403(b) and (c), Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 42, sec. 403(b)
and (c). The term "qualified individual" is defined in the Act at sec.
210(c) ; 49 Stat. 620, 625; 42 U. S. C. A., sec. 410(c), Mason's U. S. Code,
tit. 42, sec. 410(c).
eFor general discussion of the effect of marriage statutes on commonlaw marriages, consult notes in 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 353; L. R. A. 1915E
113. See also 39 A. L. R. 538 and 60 A. L. R. 541.
7Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs. 8562 et seq.
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The former class is virtually extinct by reason of statutes' and
decisions.9 Although no Minnesota case expressly denying validity to a marriage per verba de futuro cum copula has been found,
it is our opinion that the general rule in the United States declaring such marriages invalid probably would prevail in this jurisdiction."0 Since de futuro unions have at most only a small place
in modern American jurisprudence, the elimination of that class
of common-law marriages leaves the real problem untouched, for
the reason that the de praesenti marriage is ordinarily the type
with which the courts must deal.
De praesenti marriages in turn fall into two classes: marriage
by express contract" and marriage by implied contract. The
fundamental problem raised in the case of marriage by express
contract is whether the marriage is legally valid without the subsequent cohabitation12 of the parties as man and wife. In other
words, suppose the parties have entered into a written contract
of marriage but have never cohabited together."3 Is such a con8

See, for example, Nebraska Comp. Stats., (1929), sec. 42-104 and
Collins v. Hoag & Rollins, Inc., (1932) 122 Neb. 805, 241 N. W. 766,
reversing (1931) 121 Neb. 716, 238 N. W. 351.
9See, for example, Marsicano v. Marsicano, (1920) 79 Fla. 278, 84
So. 156.
1OMadden, Domestic Relations 58; Jacobs, Cases on Domestic Relations
399 n.; 38 C. J. 1319. The first two authorities state unequivocally that
there is no decision in the United States which holds that a marriage per
verba de futuro is valid. But see Hulett v. Carey, (1896) 66 Minn. 327,
336, 69 N. W. 31, 33, where it was said by way of dictum that if the contract was made per verba de futuro, "and be followed by consummation, it
amounts to a valid marriage, in the absence of any civil regulations to the
contrary. 2 Kent, Comm. 87; 2 Greenleaf Evidence, sec. 460; 1 Bishop,
Mar. & Div., secs. 218, 227-229." To the notewriter in L. R. A. 1915E, 33,
the "doctrine of marriage per verba de futuro cum copula thus seems to be a
shadow of its former self, even in the jurisdictions that have not expressly
repudiated it as a whole; and it seems a fair conclusion that the doctrine
is nearly, if not quite, obsolete." See also L. R. A. 1915E 70.
"See note 17, infra.
2Cohabitation, as used in this article, means cohabitation in the
marital relation. Obviously, cohabitation in any other relation could not
give rise to the status of husband and wife. Thimgan v. Mathews, (1923)
74 Colo. 93, 94, 219 Pac. 211, 212; Grigsby v. Reib, (1913) 105 Tex. 597, 608,
153 S. W. 1124, 1130, L. R. A. 1915E 1, 7; Ann. Cas. 1915C 1011, 1018;
McClurkin v. McClurkin, (1921) 206 Ala. 513, 515, 90 So. 917, 918;
Reppert v. Reppert, (1932) 214 Iowa 17, 24, 241 N. W. 487, 491. And see
38 C. J. 1318, n. 28, 29, 30. On the general subject of the requisites and
proof of common-law marriages, see note in (1914) 27 Harv. L. R. 378:
and "Cohabitation as Essential to a Common-Law Marriage," (1919) 3
Minn. L. Rev. 426.
"3Such was the situation in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Johnson, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1918) 254 Fed. 683. In that case, the plaintiff, who alleged that
she was the common-law wife of E. R. Spiers, recovered judgment against
the Great Northern Railway for damages growing out of the death of
her common-law husband. Plaintiff based the marriage upon a written
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tract sufficient in itself to make them man and wife? Marriage
by implied contract raises this fundamental question: When will
the "habit and repute" of marriage, i.e., the various incidents of
cohabitation, justify the inference of a contract of marriage even
though no express oral or written agreement exists?"
With respect to marriage by express contract, oral or written,
contract sent from Minnesota (where the husband was and continued to be

for some time afterward) to her in Missouri, where she resided and was
employed. The contract read as follows:
"St. Paul, Minn., March 10, 1916.
"It is hereby agreed, by and between E. R. Spiers and Mayme Woodall,
from this date henceforth to be husband and wife, and from this date
henceforth to conduct ourselves towards each other as husband and wife,
the said E. R. Spiers to contribute to the support and maintenance of the
said Mayme Woodall as her husband, and the said Mayme Woodall to
conduct herself towards the said E. R. Spiers as a dutiful wife.
[Signed] E. R. Spiers
Mayme Woodall."
Apparently no other evidence was introduced to show that the parties
were married.
The circuit court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district
court, and held the marriage valid. In its opinion the court pointed out
that, while this was a Missouri contract, both Minnesota and Missouri
recognize common-law marriage; also that in Missouri it is necessary
only for the parties to have made a legally binding agreement to become
husband and wife. The latter fact is emphasized forcibly in the following
language:
". . . Mutual assent to the present institution of the status is all suffident. No other act, such as cohabitation (Davis v. Stouffer, 132 Mo. App.
555, 112 S. W. 282), is necessary to complete the institution of the status
where the mutual assent contemplates a marriage in praesenti. Why should
the physical presence of the parties be essential to the legality of this
contract, any more than of any other? It is not for us to devise means of
making common-law marriages difficult. It is our duty to recognize the
law as it exists. Nor is there any reason why the parties should be within
the same jurisdiction. The existence and validity of the contract must
be determined by the law of the place where it is legally regarded as made.
Here, however, there is no point in the suggestion, for both of the states
involved approve common-law marriages."
In direct contrast to the holding in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Johnson
is Herd v. Herd, (1915) 194 Ala. 613, 69 So. 885. In that case the parties
engaged in a supposed ceremonial marriage which thereafter proved invalid
because the license had been issued by a justice of the peace who had no
such authority under the law of Alabama. Sexual intercourse had preceded
the alleged ceremony but, following it, the couple never cohabited together.
nor did the man contribute to the woman's support. A child was born to
them about four months after the alleged ceremony. Following the death
of the man, the probate court granted letters of administration to the
woman as his widow. The supreme court of Alabama reversed the decree
on the theory that, while the necessary present consent to marry existed,
the element of cohabitation following that consent was absent and, therefore, no common-law marriage could be spelled out under the Alabama
decisions.
14 See notes, L. R. A. 1915E 72, 91. This situation often arises where
parties have cohabited as husband and wife despite an impediment, known
or unknown, precluding an actual marriage, and have continued to do so
after the removal thereof. See also note, 3 L. R. A. (N.S.) 244.
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followed by cohabitation in the relation of husband and wife, such
a union is concededly a marriage in all states recognizing the validity of common-law marriage. 5 Difficulty arises, however, when
the alleged marriage is based only on an oral or a written contract.
The various states are in irreconcilable conflict on the question of
the sufficiency of the agreement alone to create a marriage in the
absence of matrimonial cohabitation in pursuance thereof. 10 Therefore one of the primary purposes of this article will be to ascertain
the need for cohabitation as an element of common-law marriage in
Minnesota.
COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE IN

MINNESOTA

A statement appears in Dunnell's Minnesota Digest" that
marriage is, by statute, a civil contract, in so far as its validity in
law is concerned, and that the essence of the contract is the consent of the parties. If it is made per verba de praesenti and the
parties do not thereafter cohabit, the union is nevertheless a legally
binding common-law marriage because its creation requires only
the present consent of competent parties. Cohabitation is merely
evidence of marriage and not conclusive evidence at that.
Such being some of the general propositions which have been
formulated with respect to common-law marriage in Minnesota,
15See cases collected in 38 C. J. 1318, n. 35.
loThe Alabama and Texas courts, for example, take the position that
cohabitation as man and wife is a necessary element of the common-law
union. Herd v. Herd, (1915) 194 Ala. 613, 69 So. 885; White v. White.
(1932) 225 Ala. 155, 142 So. 524; Grisby v. Reib, (1913) 105 Tex. 597,
153 S. W. 1124. On the other hand, a contract of marriage, which may or
may not be followed by cohabitation, is all that is necessary to establish
a common-law marriage in Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina. Askew
v. Dupree, (1860) 30 Ga. 173; Davis v. Stouffer, (1908) 132 Mo. App.
555, 112 S. W. 282; Jewell v. Magood, (1833) Rich. Eq. (S.C.) 113. It has
been pointed out that one weakness in the rule which requires cohabitation
as an independent element of the common-law marriage is the period of
time which must elapse before the marital status is fixed. Carried to its
logical extreme the result of this rule would be to require sexual relations
between the parties before the matrimonial relationship was legally established, "a result exactly contrary to the real purpose of the marriage
laws." See note L. R. A. 1915E 24-25.
174 Dunnell, Minn. Dig., 317, sec. 5784.
This section concludes with
the following sentence: "A [marriage] contract may be entered into by
correspondence." However, the authority for this statement is Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. Johnson, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1918) 254 Fed. 683, cited
supra, note 12. As the offer of marriage in the Johnson Case was accepted in
Missouri, the law of Missouri rather than that of Minnesota governed, a
fact pointed out by the court.
As to marriage by correspondence, see also Lorenzen, Marriage by
Proxy and the Conflict of Laws, (1919) 32 Harv. L. R. 473; and note,
Marriage by Mail, (1919) 32 Harv. L. R. 848; Beale, The Conflict of Laws
(1919) 33 Harv. L. R. 1, 13.
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let us now investigate the Minnesota decisions in the field for
whatever additional light they may cast.
The leading Minnesota case concerning common-law marriage
is the much-cited Hulett v. Carey. 18 The facts of this case were
substantially as follows:
One Lucy A. Pomeroy, who alleged that she was the commonlaw widow of Nehemiah Hulett-a man generally supposed and
reputed to be a bachelor-filed two petitions against Hulett's
estate, through which she sought (a) to have his homestead and
certain personal property set apart to her, and (b) to have the
probate of his will set aside. The probate court denied both petitions. In her appeal to the district court Lucy predicated her case
on a written contract of marriage 9 which the jury found was in
fact executed by Hulett. The evidence showed that Hulett had
employed Lucy Pomeroy as his housekeeper prior to the execution of the contract. Immediately thereafter she moved into Hulett's
room, and from that time until his death the couple occupied the
same sleeping apartment and cohabited as husband and wife. As
the marriage was kept secret, the parties never held themselves
out as a married couple. Instead, they deliberately conducted themselves in such a manner as to give the impression that their previous relation of employer and employee still existed. Hulett's
administrator contended, upon this state of facts, that there had
been no marriage because, through their failure to assume the
18(1896) 66 Minn. 327, 69 N. W. 31.
1
9The contract, which was alleged to have been executed on January 7.
1892, but which by mistake was dated Jan. 6, 1892, read as follows:
"Contract of marriage between N. Hulett and Mrs. L. A. Pomeroy.
"Believeing a marriage by Contract to be perfectly lawful, We do hereby
agree to be husband and wife, and to hereafter live together as such.
"In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands the day and year
first above written.
N. Hulett.
[Signed]
L. A. Pomeroy."
The court submitted to the jury the single question of whether the
foregoing paper was in fact executed by Nehemiah Hulett. In its submission to the jury the court excluded (as a self-serving declaration and not
part of the res gestae) evidence of a mortgage which Hulett made subsequent
to the date of signing the alleged contract of marriage, and which, in the
certificate of acknowledgment, described him as a single man. The court
also excluded for the same reason other testimony of a similar character
which was offered by the administrator.
The court admitted in evidence a letter written by Lucy to her sister,
which contained references to her relationship with Hulett, who was designated therein as "my husband" and "your brother Hulett." This letter, according to Lucy's testimony, was written in Hulett's presence and handed
to him to read. He did read it, and after sealing it in an envelope placed
the letter in his pocket. The next morning Hulett died suddenly and the
letter was mailed by a nephew, who received it from the undertaker.
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marital relation publicly, they had failed to establish the habit
or repute of marriage.
The district court held that Lucy Pomeroy was the wife of
Hulett and that therefore she was entitled to the homestead of the
deceased, and also to an allowance out of the estate for her
maintenance during the period of administration.
The supreme court of Minnesota affirmed this judgment. It
reversed, however, for reasons not material here, the judgment of
the district court setting aside the probate of Hulett's will.
In its opinion the supreme court used the following language,- '
which has become classic in the Minnesota law of common-law
marriage:
"Upon this state of facts, the contention of the appellants is
that there was no marriage, notwithstanding the execution by them
of the written contract; that, in order to constitute a valid commonlaw marriage, the contract, although per verba de praesenti, must
be followed by habit or reputation of marriage,-that is, as we
understand counsel, by the public assumption of marital relations.
We do not so understand the law.
"The law views marriage as being merely a civil contract, not
differing from any other contract, except that it is not revocable
or dissoluble at the will of the parties. The essence of the contract of marriage is the consent of the parties, as in the case of any
other contract; and, whenever there is a present, perfect consent
to be husband and wife, the contract of marriage is completed.
The authorities are practically unanimous to this effect. Marriage
is a civil contract jure gentium, to the validity of which the consent of parties able to contract is all that is required by natural
or public law. If the contract is made per verba de praesenti, and
remains without cohabitation, or if made per verba de futuro, and
be followed by consummation, it amounts to a valid marriage, in
the absence of any civil regulations to the contrary. .

.

. The

whole law on the subject is that, to render competent parties
husband and wife, they must and need only agree in the present
tense to be such, no time being contemplated to elapse before the
assumption of the status. If cohabitation follows, it adds nothing
in law, although it may be evidence of marriage. It is mutual,
present consent, lawfully expressed, which makes the marriage. .. "
While Hulett v. Carey is the leading Minnesota case in the
field of common-law marriage, it is not the oldest. As early as
1877 the supreme court of Minnesota decided State v. Worthingham.2' This case was a bastardy proceeding on the complaint of
one Mary Sullivan, who charged that the defendant Worthingham
-(1896)
21(1877)

66 Minn. 327, 336, 69 N. W. 31, 33, 34.

23 Minn. 528.
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was the father of her illegitimate child. Worthingham entered a
plea of not guilty on the premise that the child was legitimate by
reason of an alleged common-law marriage between him and the
complainant. The trial court excluded evidence 2 of the commonlaw marriage as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial and gave
the case to the jury on the theory that the existence of a ceremonial marriage was necessary in order to establish a marital
status between the defendant and Mary Sullivan.
On appeal it was held that the evidence offered by the defendant should have been received. In reaching this decision the
supreme court of Minnesota used the following language :23
".. . Not only was such evidence competent for the consideration of the jury upon the question of a present mutual consent and agreement of marriage, made after the alleged divorce,
but sufficient, if not overcome by a preponderance of evidence to
the contrary, to support a finding in favor of a valid marriage, so
far, at least, as to invest the issue with the legal rights and claims
of legitimacy, and to subject the parents to the duty of providing
for their maintenance and support."
For the next seventeen years no case involving common-law
marriage reached the supreme court of Minnesota. Then, within
the next two-year period, two cases were decided. The first was
In re Frederick Terry's Estate2 in 1894, and the second Hlett v.
Carey2k--previously discussed-in 1896.
22

Mary Sullivan testified that she had lived with the defendant for

almost eight years under a promise of marriage, five children being born

of their union. She alleged that at the beginning of the cohabitation the
defendant promised to marry her as soon as he could obtain a divorce from
his wife and that her cohabitation with him had been on that condition.
However no marriage ceremony ever was performed. The defendant admitted the paternity of the child and his legal responsibility for its support.
He offered to prove, however, that during the entire period of cohabitation
the complainant had held herself out to her friends, neighbors and the
world generally, as his wife, the relationship having started at a time when
the two of them had gone to a neighboring city for a single night and thereafter had represented themselves as married. He offered further proof that
complainant had assumed the name of Worthingham and that their children
had been given that name; also that some five years before the birth of
the child in question, he had obtained a divorce from his former wife.
23(1877) 23 Minn. 528, 536. supra. note 21.
Cf. State v. Lindskog. (1928) 175 Minn. 533, 221 N. W. 911, wherein
it was held that the evidence submitted was not sufficient to establish a
common-law marriage in order to hold a father liable for the support of
his minor children under G. S.1923, sec. 10136. During the period of cohabitation the woman had a husband living to whom she had been joined
by a ceremonial marriaze. As the statute in question did "not have reference to illegitimate children." the supreme court, per Dibell, J., held that
no crime had been committed, although the defendant had abandoned the
woman and her offspring, of which, he was admittedly the father.
24(1894) 58 Minn. 268, 59 N. W. 1013.
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In the Terry Case, Ellen Balderson appeared in the probate
court at the time of final settlement of the estate of one Terry
and alleged that she was Terry's widow, which was denied by the
next of kin. The probate court held against her. A jury in the
district court upheld her claim. Terry's administrator appealed to
the supreme court, where the question for adjudication was whether
sufficient evidence 26 had been presented to the jury to sustain its
25

Hulett v. Carey, (1896)

18, 20.
26

66 Minn. 327, 69 N. W. 31, supra, notes 10,

The evidence showed that Terry was unmarried at the time he met
Miss Balderson, some seven years before his death. The two began sexual
relations, and for a period of six months Terry was a frequent visitor to
Ellen in her rooms. He also contributed to her support. Later, he sent
her to White, a rental agent, in order that she might rent a house which
he (Terry) owned, with money supplied by him. For the next two or
three years she lived in this house, and paid the rent with Terry's money, the
receipts therefor being issued to her as Ellen Balderson. At the end of this
period Terry told White that he would thereafter collect the rent himself.
Ellen continued to live in the house until it was sold some five years later,
when she moved to other quarters which Terry rented for her until the
time of his death.
Ellen testified that during all this period Terry lived with her. No
evidence was offered that he ever lived anywhere else. She admitted that
he occasionally visited his relatives unaccompanied by her; that he never
brought friends or acquaintances to the house; that she never saw any
of his brothers or sisters who were in the vicinity; that, with few exceptions, the couple never had any persons visit them; that they never went
out in public together.
She testified further that she had nursed Terry at various times, including his last illness and death, in the house where they both lived. A
physician who had attended them in this house testified that he did not know
her as Mrs. Terry until 1885. A dentist testified that in 1885 Terry requested him to do some work on his wife's teeth and that the woman who
came to his office was Ellen Balderson. Another witness testified that
Ellen was often referred to by Terry as his wife. Another said that Terry
had often given him money in payment for coal furnished to his wife and
that he had often heard Terry refer to Ellen Balderson as such. Another
witness said that Terry had asked her to visit his wife who was ill. All
this evidence was uncontroverted.
After Terry's death, White, who was Terry's administrator, with
Ellen's assistance and consent took charge of Terry's affairs and sent his
body and his personal effects to his relatives. Ellen then told White for
the first time that she had lived with Terry during the entire period since
she had first rented his house.
Ellen testified that, after telling White that she and Terry were married,
she retracted and told White that Terry had promised to marry her, and
that he had also promised to remember her in his will and that she was
very much disappointed to find he had not done so. She informed White
of her services to Terry during his last illness and, upon being paid therefor,
gave a receipt in the name of Ellen Balderson. Ellen admitted that she had
signed a postcard addressed to White with the initials "E. B." and that
she had had several conversations with him concerning payment for her
services as Terry's housekeeper, and that she had not told White during
these conversations that she was Terry's wife. She admitted further that
she had first learned of her possible rights as Terry's common-law wife
when site consulted her lawyers.
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finding of a common-law marriage between Terry and Ellen
Balderson. In holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove
a common-law marriage, the court said :2"The marriage relation is too important a matter, and of
too much consequence to others besides the immediate contracting parties, to permit it to be established by vague or shadowy
proof.
"The order appealed from should be reversed ..
The two foregoing cases, State v. Worthingham and In re
Frederick Terry's Estate, merely set the stage for Hilett v. Carey,
and the basic law governing common-law marriage in Minnesota
may be said to date from the Hidett Case.
In 1902, six years after the Hulett Case, the Minnesota supreme
court decided the case of Heminway v. Miller.2 8 That case involved an action by the heirs-at-law of one Forrest against the
defendant who maintained that she was the widow of Forrest.
The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on a jury
verdict in their favor. 29 The supreme court examined the evi27(1894) 58 Minn. 268, 275, 59 N. W. 1013, 1015, supra, note 24.
28(1902) 87 Minn. 123, 91 N. W. 428.
29
The evidence before the trial court had been as follows:
Forrest had asked the sister of the defendant to consent to their marriage.
A witness testified that Forrest had called the defendant his wife in
her presence, and the witness believed that the defendant was Forrest's wife.
(The supreme court regarded this testimony as a conclusion drawn
from the fact that Forrest and the defendant were seen together frequently,
and that Forrest had referred to the defendant as his wife on one or two
occasions.)
Two other witnesses testified that Forrest had acknowledged the marriage.
A physician said that the defendant had been introduced by Forrest as
his wife and that at the time of this introduction the two were living together.
Another physician, and also a real estate agent from whom an apartment was rented, testified that Forrest introduced or referred to the defendant as his wife in the course of conversations with each of them. However, it was shown also that the defendant always used her unmarried name
at the various houses which she and Forrest occupied and also in the presence
of their friends and acquaintances. Then, too, it appeared that Forrest was
often referred to by the parties as her uncle, and she as his niece.
The defendant testified that for a period of about six years she and
Forrest had cohabited together through the use of adjoining rooms, but that
they had studiously avoided disclosing their true relationship.
For the purpose of proving that Forrest and the defendant were not
married, the district court received in evidence a mortgage, which described
Forrest as a widower, and to which the defendant subscribed her maiden
name as a witness.
(The supreme court held this mortgage to be competent evidence inasmuch as it was a declaration in writing to the effect that Forrest and
defendant were unmarried during a period when they were orally asserting
the existence of a marriage by introductions and admissions to third parties. See infra, note 41.)
To establish the marriage contract, the defendant relied on the co-
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dence and affirmed the judgment. In so holding, the court observed :30
"In the first place, it must be clearly borne in mind that there
is no direct evidence of a marriage contract. .

.

. No witness

heard it and there is no contract in writing. The fact of the
marriage is sought to be established purely by the inference or
presumption which arises from the conduct of the parties. First,
as to cohabitation. It is true that, where persons cohabit together
as husband and wife in the matrimonial relation, and hold out each
other as such in the community in which they reside, then they
will be presumed to be husband and wife, in the absence of any
direct evidence of a marriage contract. But, in order to establish
such inference, it is the universal holding that the cohabitation
must in all respects be matrimonial. In this case we have the appellant's own testimony of the fact that she cohabited with Mr.
Forrest continuously for six years. But she admitted that during that time she passed as his niece, was known by her maiden
name, and that their true relations were kept from the knowledge of the people with whom they lived. While it is not necessary to go so far as to say that this condition raised the presumption that their relations were illegitimate, it certainly does not
establish a presumption that the relation was matrimonial. Therefore, to give appellant all that can be conceded, no presumption
will be drawn either one way or the other from the mere fact of
cohabitation, as testified to by her."
Shattuck v. Shattuck's Estate3' was decided in 1912. This case
involved the single question of whether or not a woman who called
herself Don Lynn Shattuck was the widow of Arthur C. Shattuck,
deceased. No provision for or recognition of her was contained
in Shattuck's will, but nevertheless, she entered a claim against his
estate as his surviving widow. The probate court dismissed the
claim and she appealed to the district court where, on conflicting
evidence, 2 the jury found that the woman was the common-law
habitation referred to and the declarations set forth above. There was no
attempt to establish the relationship by reputation and the defendant conceded that there was no sufficient evidence to that effect.
30(1902) 87 Minn. 123, 127, 91 N. W. 428. 429.
31(1912) 118 Minn. 60, 136 N. W. 409.
3-Don Lynn Shattuck, who did business in Minneapolis as a "fashionable dressmaker," testified that-at some time after her divorce from her
first husband-she and Shattuck, who was a bachelor and by occupation a
traveling salesman, mutually agreed to become husband and wife and thereafter cohabited as such until his death. The trial court refused to permit
respondent to testify expressly as to this agreement, but found sufficietit
corroboration of her statements in the subsequent cohabitation of the parties
and the general repute of the marriage to give judgment for Mrs. Shattuck.
The parties had rented and lived in apartments where the landlord
understood they were husband and wife. Shattuck, in letters to his relatives, had referred to his relationship with respondent and had been advised
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widow of Shattuck. The supreme court of Minnesota affirmed the
judgment of the district court in her favor on the theory that,
while some items of evidence (particularly the secrecy surrounding the relationship of the parties) tended to negative the existence
of a marital relationship, nevertheless, the existence of a marriage
agreement was a question for the jury and the jury had decided it.
One year later (1913) the case of Le Suer v. Le Suer33 was
decided. This case involved three actions by one Mary Jane
Le Suer against certain parties, to one of whom E. 1'. Le Suer had
conveyed various parcels of land during his lifetime. The plaintiff, as the alleged wife of Le Suer who had not been joined in
the conveyances, claimed an undivided one-third interest in the
lands. The woman based her claim on a ceremonial marriage
which the trial court found did not exist. Consequently it was
necessary for her to establish the fact that she had been the coinmon-law wife of Le Suer. While the evidence revealed cohabitation and an announcement of marriage by the parties at the time
of the alleged ceremony and the birth of a child later, the subsequent conduct of the couple was such that the trial court found
that no common-law marriage existed.3' The supreme court of
by one of them that, under the laws of some states, respondent was his
common-law wife. In other letters Shattuck spoke of the respondent in
endearing terms but nowhere did he refer to her as his wife. He did inform

a close friend that he intended to marry Don Lynn.
Various witnesses testified as to the cohabitation and the demeanor
of the parties toward each other; that they (the witnesses) believed the
parties to be husband and wife; and that Don Lynn's conduct during
Shattuck's various illnesses, particularly his last one, had been that of a
wife.
122 Minn. 407, 142 N. W. 593.
33(1913)
34
The evidence showed that E. P. Le Suer and Mary Jane Le Suer
had cohabited for a considerable time in New York State, a child being
born to them. Thereafter Mary Jane left Le Suer and went to Minnesota with another man. About a year later she wrote Le Suer that she
had been abandoned and he brought her back to New York where they
lived together for another year.
Mary Jane then disappeared once more with the same man, and about
a year later she wrote Le Suer that she had again been abandoned in Minnesota. Le Suer then went to that state and for a second time they resumed cohabitation and a second child was born.
Shortly thereafter, Mary Jane left both Le Suer and her children
and never lived with him again.
The children were placed by Le Suer with his relatives, from whom
Mary Jane obtained them by means of a forged letter purporting to have
been signed by Le Suer. Le Suer then went south, in order to locate his
children; he returned shortly thereafter with another woman whom lie
presented as his wife, and with whom he lived until she died.
Later Le Suer married again, several children being born of that union.
Thereafter Le Suer married once more and lived with his ultimate wife for
some thirty years, one child being born of this marriage.
Meanwhile Mary Jane had been living in New Orleans and had in-
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Minnesota, in affirming the judgment, used the following language :1
"That parties cohabit as husband and wife and hold themselves out as such is evidence of marriage, but not conclusive evidence. It may be done for the purpose of concealing their illicit
relations. To constitute a valid common-law marriage the parties
must contract with each other to be husband and wife. 'It is
mutual, present consent, lawfully expressed, which makes marriage.' If they cohabit without such understanding and agreement,
they are not husband and wife however long such relation may
continue. ....

"

During the last seven years, four cases involving common-law
marriage have been decided by the supreme court of Minnesota.
The first of these was In re Estate of Babetha Noser30 in 1930.
This was the only Minnesota case found which concerned a common-law husband. The man in question was Werner Noser, who
filed a claim as common-law husband against the estate of Babetha
Noser. The probate court denied the claim, and an appeal was
taken to the district court, where a jury found the parties had
agreed to become husband and wife and had cohabited together
under this agreement.3 7 The supreme court of Minnesota held that
the jury's verdict should not be disturbed. Cohabitation between
Babetha and Werner Noser (the nephew of Babetha's first husband, August Noser, and twelve years her junior) began at a
time when Babetha was still married to August. August left home
formed her relatives that she was married to a man named Thompson,
and was known from that time on as Mrs. Thompson. She never made
any claim that she was Le Suer's wife until after his death, although she
knew of each of his marriages.
35(1913) 122 Minn. 407, 410, 142 N. W. 593, 594.
36(1930) 180 Minn. 463, 231 N. W. 199.
37
Although Babetha and Werner Noser had apparently cohabited continuously from 1886 to 1917, and although three illegitimate children had
been born to them, the evidentiary facts on which the jury found a commonlaw marriage to exist occurred subsequent to the latter date. After
August's death in 1917 Werner and Babetha moved to Pine Island, Minnesota, where they lived together, occupied the same bedroom, and "in
other ways evidenced a changed and more intimate relationship." Many
witnesses testified that thereafter the couple were reputed to be husband
and wife and lived together as such. Cards were received addressed to
them as Mr. and Mrs. Werner Noser, Sr. and the grandchildren called
them "Grandpa" and "Grandma." Their children, who formerly referred
to Werner as "Uncle," now started calling him "Dad."
The court submitted three questions for the jury's determination:
(1) Did Werner Noser, Sr. and Babetha Noser, at a time when they
could lawfully make such an agreement, agree by mutual present consent
to be husband and wife? (2) Did they cohabit, that is, live together under
said agreement, as husband and wife? (3) Did they hold each other out
to the public, under said agreement, as being husband and wife?
The jury answered all three questions in the affirmative.
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in 1887, after an illegitimate son had been born to Babetha and
Werner, but he continued to live in the neighborhood until 1917,
the year of his death. Although the union of Babetha and Werner
was criminal in its inception and continued to be such until the
death of August thirty years later, the jury found, nevertheless,
that after August's death the relationship had changed sufficiently
(particularly in its external manifestation) to warrant the inference of a common-law marriage.
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the supreme
court observed :38
"...
In order to prove a common-law marriage, the evidence
must show facts and circumstances establishing a contract between the parties to be husband and wife. A present mutual consent lawfully expressed is necessary; mere cohabitation as husband
and wife is evidence of marriage but is not conclusive.. .. "
The second decision in this recent group of cases is In re
Lust's Estate (Ghelin v. Johnson) " decided in 1932. The Minnesota Loan & Trust Company, Minneapolis, was appointed administrator of the estate of Frank Ghelin, on petition of three
sisters and a brother of the deceased. The appointment was opposed by one Marie Chapman, or Marie Chapman Ghelin, who
alleged that she was the surviving widow of the deceased and that
therefore she should be appointed sole administratrix.
The probate court found that Marie was not the surviving
widow of Ghelin. She thereafter appealed to the district court,
where a jury made a similar finding, and judgment was entered
accordingly. The supreme court of Minnesota reversed the judgment on the ground that certain evidence"0 which had been admitted should have been excluded.
38(1930) 180 Minn. 463, 466, 231 N. W. 199, 200.
39(1932) 186 Minn. 405, 243 N. W. 443.
4OThis evidence was as follows:
1. An application made by the deceased for a passport, wherein he
stated that he was unmarried. This was held to be merely a self-serving
declaration.
2. A holographic will made by Ghelin in which substantial bequests
were made to Mrs. Marie Chapman, who was not referred to as the
decedent's wife. As it was conceded that the instrument was not so
executed as to be a valid will, or to be valid for any purpose, it amounted
to nothing more than a private written memorandum, and was merely a
self-serving declaration made by the deceased.
3. Charts and records from a hospital in New York City, wherein
Ghelin had been a patient, and in connection therewith, certain statements
made by him to hospital attendants. The charts and records described
Ghelin as a single man. These documents, as well as statements made by
Ghelin to the hospital attendants, were merely hearsay, self-serving and
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The Ghelin Case is of primary importance in Minnesota law
for the reason that it reviews the preceding Minnesota cases dealing with common-law marriage, and then sets forth certain general
propositions with respect to the kind of evidence 1 which is admissible to prove such a marriage.
The third case in the series is In re Welker's Estate' 2 decided
in 1936. In that case one Doris Halstead, who alleged that she
was the common-law wife of the deceased, filed objections in a
proceeding which had been instituted by a third party for the
inadmissible.

In the three foregoing instances the evidence was excluded because the
documents in question were not made in the presence of the alleged commonlaw widow nor brought to her attention.
However, the supreme court held that a certain income tax statement
filed by Ghelin, in which he described himself as a single man, was admissible, on the theory that it was a declaration against interest. Had
Ghelin described himself as a married man, he could thereby have effected
saving in his income tax.
a considerable
41These propositions follow:
(1) The best evidence is a written contract of marriage such as
was in existence in the case of Hulett v. Carey.
(2) If there is no written contract of marriage, the claimant cannot
testify to a verbal contract of marriage because the other party to the
alleged contract is dead. Therefore, she must prove the contract of
marriage by what is referred to in the Hulett Case as evidence of "habit
and repute."
(3) Such "habit and repute" are shown most clearly by evidence of
cohabitation as man and wife, or the assumption openly of marital duties
and obligations, for such time and to such extent as to reasonably sustain
the conclusion or inference that parties have agreed to become husband
and wife.
(4) General reputation that the parties are married is not alone
sufficient to prove marriage but may be shown in connection with cohabitation and other circumstances.
(5) Where the claimant seeks to prove a common-law marriage by
circumstantial evidence, the oral or written admissions of the other party
to the alleged contract are admissible.
(6) Evidence of oral or written admissions or declarations of the
claimant that she was unmarried at the time when she later claimed a
marriage existed, are admissible against her.
(7) The claimant cannot present only her own admissions or declarations that the marriage exists, made to third persons, not in the presence
of, or consented to by, the other party to the alleged marriage contract.
Declarations in denial of the marriage, made by the other party to third
persons, not in the presence of, or acquiesced in by, the claimant, are inadmissible, unless admissible under some exception to the hearsay rule.
(8)

". . . What was said in the Hulett case . . . about it not being

necessary to show cohabitation or the assumption of marital duties and
obligations, has reference to the express written contract of marriage in
praesenti, which was the matter in issue in that action. What was said
in the Heminway case ...about the admission of evidence in denial of the
marriage goes only to the extent of holding that a mortgage executed by the
alleged husband, describing him as a single man, was admissible in evidence because the one claiming to be his wife signed it as a witness. Having
by her signature attested it, it was admissible against her."
42(1936) 196 Minn. 447, 265 N. W. 273.
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appointment of an administrator. The probate court held that
Doris was not the common-law wife of the deceased. Thereafter
a jury in the district court found that a common-law marriage
existed.43 On appeal from the resulting judgment, the supreme
court pointed out that no direct proof of a marriage contract had
been submitted, and held the circumstantial evidence offered to
be insufficient to support a finding that a marriage contract existed
in fact. The court said that the cohabitation shown was of a kind
that could not give rise to the inference of marriage and observed' that
". .. No case can be found where, there being no other evidence of the contract, habit and repute of the scant and equivocal
sort shown here have been held sufficient to sustain judicial affirmation of marriage."
The last case in the recent group is Guplil v. E. 0. Dahlquist
Contracting Company,45 also decided in 1936.
This was an action under the Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act by Margaret Guptil, the unmarried mother and natural
guardian of a child whose father was alleged to be Roy Scheid,
deceased. The proceeding sought compensation for the child as
a dependent of Scheid, and was opposed by Scheid's employer and
the Sun Indemnity Company as insurer. The woman brought
certiorari to review an order of the Industrial Commission denying compensation to the child. The supreme court discharged the
writ and affirmed the order of the commission on the ground
43The following evidence was submitted to the jury:
The deceased had "kept company" with Doris for about four months,
before he began operating a certain hotel. She then became his employee,
and as such received wages for about four months, during which time
he bought her a diamond ring. Thereafter the parties cohabited for sixteen
months, but kept their relationship secret. After the gift of the ring.
Doris received no more wages but she did get all the money she needed in
small amounts, together with gifts, including an automobile which the
deceased considered as belonging to her.

Letters which Doris maintained she had received from the deceased

were not in evidence. She did not maintain that he had addressed her as
his wife. In fact she continued to go under her maiden name, and she
did not even maintain that the letters in question saluted her as the wife
of the deceased.
The couple did not suggest to third parties that their relations had

become matrimonial. On the contrary, Doris continued to address her
alleged husband as "Mr. Welker," "Elmer," "Uncle Elmer," "Daddy,"
"Uncle," or "Unk." Also, Doris continued her former work as waitress

in the hotel.
Although Doris nursed the deceased on his deathbed, he gave the keys
of the hotel to an acquaintance.
44(1936) 196 Minn. 447, 451, 265 N. W. 273, 275.
45(1936) 197 Minn. 211, 266 N. W. 748.
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that the proof established nothing beyond an agreement to marry
at a future date.

4

1

CONCLUSIONS

1. Substantive Law.-The foregoing analysis of Minnesota
decisions warrants the conclusion that legal sanction will be given
by the courts of this state to a common-law marriage entered into
between legally competent parties by means of a contract presently
operative. The contract may be either oral or written, express
or implied.
That the existence of a contract is the fact fundamental to the
existence of a common-law marriage is stated positively by the
supreme court of Minnesota. 47 Furthermore, once the contract
is established, it is not necessary to show cohabitation between
46The facts of the case were not in dispute. The defendant was employed by the contracting company as a truck driver. He died on July
2, 1931, as the result of injuries suffered in the course of his employment.
At the date of his death he and Margaret Guptil, whom he had courted
for about one year, had agreed to marry two days later, on July 4, 1931,
in a double wedding ceremony with Margaret's younger sister and the
sister's fiance. The marriage banns had been published for three successive
Sundays in the Roman Catholic church, and the license for the marriage
had been procured.
About eight and one-half months after Scheid's death, Margaret Guptil
gave birth to the child in question. The only proof with respect to the
child's paternity was Margaret's testimony that Scheid was the father of
the child. No proof was offered that the parties had agreed upon any
other kind of marriage than the ceremonial marriage scheduled for July
4, 1931.
Margaret's counsel urged the court to find that at the time when
the child was begotten, the parties must have intended a present legal
status of husband and wife; that "in their own minds" they regarded
"themselves as husband and wife" and thereby "consummated that marriage
relation."
The supreme court rejected this contention, and quoted with approval
the following language from the case of United States v. Dorto, (C.C.A.
1st Cir. 1925) 5 F. (2d) 596, 597:
"In order to constitute a marriage per verba de presenti, the parties
must agree to become husband and wife presently. The consent which is
the foundation and essence of the contract must be mutual and given at
the same time, and it must not be attended by an agreement that some
intervening thing shall be done before the marriage takes effect, or that
it be publicly solemnized. That is to say, it must contemplate a present
assumption of the marriage status, in distinction from a mere future union."
47
"The law views marriage as being merely a civil contract, not differing from any other contract, except that it is not revocable or dissoluble
at the will of the parties. The essence of the contract of marriage is the
consent of the parties, as in the case of any other contract; and, whenever
there is a present, perfect consent to be husband and wife, the contract
of marriage is completed."-Mitchell, J., in Hulett v. Carey, (1896) 66
Minn. 327, 336, 69 N. W. 31. 33, cited supra, notes 10. 18, 20, 25. Accord:
In re Welker's Estate, (1936) 196 Minn. 447, 450, 265 N. W. 273, 274,
cited supra, notes 42, 44.
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the parties subsequent to their agreement of marriage. In this
respect, as has been pointed out previously, the law of Minnesota
differs from that of some other American states. Therefore, since
the existence of a contract of marriage is the fundamental fact,
the manner in which such fact must be proved becomes highly
important. If the contract is express, that is, in writing or
made orally in the presence of witnesses, the problem of proof
usually is easily solved. However, as the Minnesota decisions so
clearly demonstrate, the average couple who enter into the commonlaw marriage relationship rarely reduce their agreement to writing
or make their bargain in the presence of third parties. Their more
usual course is to begin living together. And it is from the
factual incidents of this "living together" or cohabitation that
the law determines whether an implied common-law marriage contract has been entered into.
2. Evidence.-Since Minnesota requires only a contract in
order to establish a common-law marriage, it is unnecessary to
consider what evidence 4 would be acceptable to show matrimonial
cohabitation as an independent element in setting up the marriage.
However, evidence which in other states would be required for
that purpose is valuable in Minnesota in those cases in which proof
of the contract must be inferential. In our discussion of the types
of evidence necessary in Minnesota to prove the marriage contract by inference we shall follow the outline used in other states
where cohabitation must be shown as an independent substantive
element following the making of the contract.
a. Cohabitation.-Evidence of cohabitation' to be admissible
48Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9899: "When the fact of marriage is
required or offered to be proved before any court, evidence of the admis-

sion of such fact by the party against whom the proceeding is instituted, or
of general repute, or of cohabitation as married persons, or any other
circumstantial or presumptive evidence from which the fact may be inferred,

shall 9be competent."
4 The meaning of the term "cohabitation" as used here is that given
by the court in the case of State v. Gieseke, (1914) 125 Minn. 497, 498, 147
N. W. 663, 664:
" ...Where it is sought to prove cohabitation as evidence that the
relation of husband and wife existed between the parties, it
together as husband and wife and holding themselves out as
tinguished from occasionally associating together and from
relations...."'
However, as pointed out by the court, the meaning to be

means living
such, as dismeretricious
given to the

term "cohabit" will depend on the subject matter to which it relates. In the
Gieseke Case a much more limited meaning was ascribed to the word for
purposes of prosecution under a criminal statute which read: "Whenever
any man and a single woman cohabit with each other, both shall be guilty

of fornication."
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must be of cohabitation in the relation of man and wife.10 A mere
living together, where the parties never received guests in the
manner of married persons and did not so conduct themselves in
their home, is insufficient.'
A surreptitious cohabitation, accomplished through the use of adjoining rooms, with the woman
retaining her unmarried name, is not of the matrimonial character
required to establish a marriage. 52 No presumptions arise from a
cohabitation frequently interrupted and finally stopped altogether,
the parties thereafter entering into other marriages which on
3
their face were bona fide.r
As cohabitation is merely evidence of a marriage contract and
not conclusive on the point, it is for the jury to determine whether
any particular "living together" was matrimonial, or whether a
cohabitation illicit in its inception later became marital in character.54 A mere secret cohabitation will not be sufficient to establish a marriage where other surrounding circumstances show
clearly that there had been no assumption of matrimonial responsibilities.55 The cohabitation must in all respects be matrimonial. 50
It must be matrimonial in nature, professed and open, such as will
create some public recognition that their intentions were matrimonial. 5 7
b. Attitude of the Parties.-As the Minnesota courts admit
evidence of the attitude of the parties toward their relationship
for the purpose of showing whether a bona fide marriage was
contemplated, it is error to exclude evidence of such attitude."
This evidence may take various forms. For instance, the fact
that the alleged husband never brought his relatives or friends to
his home; that the alleged wife on various occasions used her
maiden name and referred to herself as his housekeeper rather
than his wife; and that she first learned from her lawyers after
5
oState
51

v. Worthingham, (1877) 23 Minn. 528, 533, supra, notes, 21,23.
In re Frederick Terry's Estate, (1894) 58 Minn. 268, 272, 59 N. W.
1013,521014, supra, notes 24, 27.
Heminway v. Miller, (1902) 87 Minn. 123, 125, 91 N. W. 428, supra,
notes5328,30.
Le Suer v. Le Suer, (1913) 122 Minn. 407, 410, 142 N. W. 593, 594,
supra, notes 33, 35.
54In re Estate of Babetha Noser, (1930) 180 Minn. 463, 466, 231 N. W.
199, 200, supra, notes 36, 38.
5In re Welker's Estate, (1936) 196 Minn. 447, 451, 265 N. W. 273,
275, 5cited upra, notes 42, 44, 47.
(Heminway v. Miller, (1902) 87 Minn. 123, 128, 91 N. W. 428, 429,
supra, notes 28, 30.
57
1n re Lust's Estate, (Ghelin v. Johnson), (1932)
186 Minn. 405,
408, 243 N. W. 443. 445, supra, note 39, quoting from 38 C. J. 1318.
58
State v. Worthingham, (1877) 23 Minn. 528, supra, notes 21, 23.
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his death of the possibility of establishing an interest in his estate
as his common-law widow, all constitute valuable evidence of the
non-existence of a marriage.' 9 On the other hand, it is sometimes
possible to establish the existence of a marriage by showing a
change in the attitude of the parties toward their relationship. At
the outset they may consider themselves paramour and mistress;
later they may regard their status as that of husband and wife,
and so conduct themselves as to effect that change.00
It should be emphasized also that the decisions attach decided
weight to the attitude of the woman toward the relationship.
Where she has been content to pass herself off as an unmarried
woman and has made statements to that effect, the Minnesota
courts have concluded that no marriage existed.6' Also, a woman
separated from her alleged husband cannot subsequently establish
the fact that she is his common-law wife where she made no such
claim over a period during which he--with her knowledge--contracted several other marriages. 62 On the other hand, testimony
as to the demeanor of the woman during illness of the man (serving
3
as his nurse, etc.) is entitled to considerable weight.
In determining the attitude of the parties toward their relationship, the supreme court of Minnesota has stated several general
rules as to how far the statements or admissions of one or the
other of them may be received in evidence. Although these rules
were set forth previously in a footnote, 64 their importance justifies
repetition here :65

1. Where the claimant seeks to prove a common-law marriage by circumstantial evidence, the oral or written admissions of
the other party concerning the alleged contract are admissible in
evidence.
2. In the same connection, evidence of oral or written admissions or declarations of the claimant that she is unmarried,
59In re Frederick Terry's Estate, (1894) 58 Minn. 268, 272, 273,
59 N.0 W. 1013, 1014, 1015, supra, notes 24, 27.
6 In re Estate of Babetha Noser, (1930) 180 Minn. 463, 231 N. W.
199, supra, notes 36, 38.
'Heminmvay v. Miller, (1902) 87 Minn. 123, 125, 91 N. W. 428, supra,
notes6228, 30.
Le Suer v. Le Suer, (1913) 122 Minn. 407, 409, 142 N. W. 593,
594, supra,
notes 33, 35.
3
6 Shattuck v. Shattuck's Estate, (1912) 118 Minn. 60, 62, 136 N. W.
409, 410, supra, note 31.
64
See note 41 supra.
65
1n re Lust's Estate (Ghelin v. Johnson), (1932) 186 Minn. 405
409, 243 N. W. 443, 445, supra, note 39. See Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat..
sec. 9899.
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made at a time when it is claimed the marriage existed, are admissible against her.
3. The claimant cannot present her own admissions or declarations that the marriage exists, made to third persons, not in the
presence of, or consented to by, the other party to the alleged
marriage contract.
4. Declarations in denial of the marriage, made by the other
party to third persons, not in the presence of, or acquisced in by,
the claimant, are inadmissible, unless admissible under some
exception to the hearsay rule.
c. Reputation.-The reputation which the association of the
parties in question bears in the particular community is also of
value in proving or disproving a common-law marriage.""
"The thing wanted in such a case is the verdict of the community, 'the understanding among the neighbors and acquaintances
with whom the parties associate in their daily life that they are
living together as husband and wife, and not in meretricious intercourse.' "67
Of course if such evidence is to be worth anything it must
be generally uniform in character. if some persons in the community believe the couple to be associating illicitly and other
persons believe them to be man and wife, virtually nothing has
been proved.18
Such reputation cannot be established by scant and equivocal
testimony, as, for instance, that of two witnesses who testified
'
"almost altogether from their own observations. "09
However, in
certain instances witnesses have been permitted to testify that
they understood the parties were married. 0 Furthermore, evidence of reputation is admissible to show circumstantially the
attitude of the parties toward their relationship. And, in order
to explain why the existence of the alleged marriage was not
known generally in the community, the testimony of one of the
parties is proper."
66
Evidence of "general repute, or of cohabitation as married persons,
or any other circumstantial or presumptive evidence from which the fact
may be
inferred, shall be competent." Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9899.
67In re Welker's Estate, (1936) 196 Minn. 447, 451, 265 N. W. 273, 275,

supra,
notes 42, 44, 47.
68

Heminway v. Miller, (1902) 87 Minn. 123, 128, 91 N. W. 428, 429.
notes 28, 30.
supra,
69
Heminway v. Miller, (1902) 87 Minn. 123, 128, 91 N. W. 428, 429,
supra,70 notes 28, 30.
Shattuck v. Shattuck's Estate, (1912) 118 Minn. 60, 62, 136 N. W.
409, 7410, supra, note 31.
1Shattuck v. Shattuck's Estate, (1912) 118 Minn. 60, 63.
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d. Written evidence.-From the cases examined it appears
that written evidence of all types is of peculiar value in determining the true nature of any relationship which is alleged to be a
common-law marriage. The value of such evidence lies in its power
to reveal the attitude of the parties thereto and the manner in
which they desired other to look upon their relationship-that is,
the repute which they intended to establish. For this purpose the
following kinds of written evidence have been admitted: receipts ;"
correspondence between the parties, and their correspondence with
third persons ;73 a mortgage which the alleged wife attested in
7
her maiden name as a witness .
In one case the supreme court, in denying the existence of a
common-law marriage, noted particularly the fact that although
the woman testified she had letters from the deceased, she did
not introduce them in evidence or maintain that they were addressed to her as his wife.75 Where circumstantial evidence is
relied on, the written admissions of the parties as to the existence
or non-existence of a marriage are generally admissible."0 However, certain papers, such as an invalid holographic will, hospital
records, a passport application-all describing the man as tinmarried-are inadmissible as self-serving declarations unless
previously called to the attention of the woman and acquiesced in
But not so in the case of an income tax return in
by her.7
which the man described himself as unmarried. This was held
to be an admission against interest, as he would have received
a larger exemption from tax payment if he had stated that he
78

was married.
72
In re Frederick Terry's Estate, (1894) 58 Minn. 268, 273, 59 N. W.
1013. 1015, supra, notes 24. 27.
73In re Frederick Terry's
Estate, (1894) 58 Minn. 268. 273, 59
N. W. 1013, 1015, supra, notes 24, 27; Hulett v. Carey. (1896) 66 Minn.
327, 333, 69 N. W. 31, 32, supra, notes 18. 20. 25. 47; Shattuck v. Shattuck's
Estate, 1912) 118 Minn. 60, 62, 136. N. W. 409. 410, supra. note 31: In re
Estate of Babetha Noser, (1930) 180 Minn. 463, 464, 231 N. W. 199, 200,
supra, notes 36,38.
74Heminway v. Miller, (1902) 87 Minn. 123, 129, 91 N. W. 428, 430,
supra.5 notes 28, 30.
Thin re Welker's Estate, (1936) 196 Minn. 447, 449, 265 N. W. 273,
274, 7supra, notes 42. 44, 47.
61n re Lust's Estate (Ghelin v. Johnson),
(1932) 186 Minn. 405, 409,
243 N. W. 443, 445, supra, note 39.
77In re Lust's Estate (Ghelin v. Johnson), (1932)
243 N. W. 443, 445,
446. 7
In re Lust's Estate (Ghelin v. Johnson), (1932) 186 Minn. 405, 410,
411, 243 N. W. 443, 446.

